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1 Introduction 
Foreign investments between investors and the states hosting their investments can take 
many forms. The international legal framework for foreign investment is maintained pri-
marily by the investment treaty regime,
1
 which covers questions of admission to the mar-
ket, treatment by the host state and dispute settlement. The protected types of investment 
usually include property and property rights; shares and other participation rights in com-
panies; rights arising from concessions and others. If a state violates these rights, the inves-
tor can refer to dispute settlement procedures in accordance with the investment treaty, 
usually, in the form of international arbitration. The majority of investment disputes arise in 
industries which are traditionally attractive for foreign investment (oil and gas, mining, real 
estate development and construction). They have been well described, and more or less 
predictable in terms of outcomes due to extensive arbitral practice. 
A different situation appears in new industries in the modern era of globalization. New 
technological developments open the way to unprecedented areas of commercially attrac-
tive activities. However, in new sectors of the economy, states face a tabula rasa from the 
beginning, and thus diverge in approaches and often adopt contradictory policies. 
This is exactly the case with investments in the renewable energy (RE) sector, which were 
developed during the last 30 years with a great variety of supporting measures. This thesis 
is focused on a new type of claims in the context of investment treaty law – claims con-
cerning the support schemes to RE producers. 
Due to the global scope of investment treaty arbitration (ITA), this thesis is intentionally 
limited so as to focus on a particular geographical scale (European Union (EU) and its 
Member States) and a particular subject-matter type of investment treaty arbitrations (RE 
disputes, specifically photovoltaic (PV) solar energy disputes). 
First, the assessment of the relationship between ITA and the promotion of RE will be lim-
ited to certain EU Member States in order to show the variety of national policies within a 
                                                 
 
1
 Besides international treaties, the legal framework may be also based on investment contracts and host state 
legislation relating to foreign investment. 
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centralized regulatory framework, helping to conduct a diversified assessment of policy 
measures and their potential impact on ITA proceedings. Assessment of these states’ poli-
cies will also be curtailed as to focus on legislative and regulatory measures that have been 
claimed to violate provisions in investment treaties by negatively affecting the rights of 
private investors who have invested in the PV solar sector in selected EU Member States.  
Second, the assessment will be limited to ITAs that have arisen as a result of changes made 
to support schemes relating to the promotion of investments in the PV solar sector. This 
choice is reasoned by two connected facts. First, PV solar projects appear to be highly de-
pendent on technological progress, which have gradually made PV solar panels more com-
petitive with traditional energy sources. Second, empirical evidence demonstrates that the 
majority of RE investment claims filed to date have been related to PV solar projects. Ac-
cordingly, this thesis will concentrate on a particular type of support scheme – feed-in tar-
iffs (FITs) – that have been the predominant means of incentivizing investment in PV solar 
projects. FITs may be described as a support scheme consisting of at least three design op-
tions: (i) an obligation to purchase energy, (ii) on a predefined tariff level and (iii) for a 
long duration of tariff payment.
2
 Other support measures (such as feed-in premiums, trada-
ble green certificates, priority access to the electric grid, etc.) will be covered to the extent 
that these mechanisms may play a role in future ITAs. 
Third, the assessment is limited to ITA claims, leaving aside the discussion over national 
court cases relating to changes in the incentivization of PV solar energy, which can be also 
quite extensive.
3
 
The structure of the thesis will first discuss the EU-level policies relating to the incentiviza-
tion of RE among its Member States and how these policies relate to the investment treaty 
                                                 
 
2
 David Jacobs, Renewable energy policy convergence in the EU: the evolution of feed-in tariffs in Germany, 
Spain and France (Ashgate Publishing 2012) 27. 
3
 According to reports, at least than 125 lawsuits concerning renewables were accepted by the Spanish Su-
preme Court and about a 1000 lawsuits filed in domestic Italian courts (see ‘Slew of Spanish lawsuits filed 
over renewable energy reforms’ (Reuters Africa, 2014) 
<http://af.reuters.com/article/energyOilNews/idAFL6N0RO4JP20140923> accessed 31.07.2015; Gaetano 
Iorio Fiorelli, ‘Italy withdraws from Energy Charter Treaty’ (Global Arbitration News, 2015) 
<http://globalarbitrationnews.com/italy-withdraws-from-energy-charter-treaty-20150507/> accessed 
31.07.2015). 
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regime and the rise in the number of ITAs based on changes to the support schemes in the 
PV solar sector specifically. Second, this thesis will conduct an empirical analysis of RE 
policies (abridged for focus on PV solar energy) in selected EU Member States by describ-
ing the background of regulation, response to EU Directives, further growth of incentives 
and the current reduction of support measures. Third, and based on a policy review, the 
thesis will analyze which national regulatory measures have formed the basis of investment 
treaty claims and examine what investment protections may be further invoked by specifi-
cally concentrating on the fair and equitable treatment (FET) standard due to its universal 
character and growing popularity in ITA. The final section of the thesis will identify the 
factors arising from the different number of ITA cases against EU Member States to date 
and provide insights into how these cases might be resolved and how they will affect future 
arbitral practice as well as future policy choices on the incentivization of RE among EU 
Member States. 
Research questions and methodology 
The general research question of this thesis is an inquiry into why states succeed and fail in 
their RE policies judging by the amount of investment treaty disputes that have been filed 
against them. Although the success in RE policies can be examined from different angles, 
assessment from the prospective of ITA is a novel approach. 
The detailed research questions, which will be considered further, are as follows: 
1. How have EU policies on the promotion of RE affected EU Member States’ ac-
tions in regard to the design of support schemes and other incentivization mecha-
nisms for encouraging investment in the RE sector?  
2. How have these support schemes been implemented by EU Member States and 
what types of regulatory changes have triggered disputes arising out of these 
same states investment treaty obligations?  
3. What are the common features of the RE sector ITA cases that have arisen as a 
result of support scheme changes among certain EU Member States? What stand-
ards under investment treaties are likely to be invoked in these cases? 
4. What features of national RE policies might influence the incidence of ITA? 
What measures are currently being targeted in these disputes? What measures 
 4 
could be potentially targeted in states which have not faced RE-related ITA 
claims to date? 
The analytical framework and methodological approach for addressing the research ques-
tions will include the following:  
1. Analysis of primary legal sources (international acts, including the EU legal 
framework; national legislation and judicial decisions of selected EU Member 
States). With regard to national legislation, references to the original text of par-
ticular texts will be made where possible.  
2. Analysis of legal doctrine in research of national RE policies and in the field of 
ITA. 
3. Identification and empirical analysis of currently known RE investment cases, 
with the assistance of the PluriCourts Investment Treaty Arbitration Database 
(PITAD). 
 5 
2 The EU and the PV solar bubble: the sleep of reason produces 
monsters 
The shift to a diversified energy supply and increased reliance on RE production within the 
EU has been on the agenda for decades. Following international obligations to limit carbon 
dioxide emissions,
4
 two principal directives were adopted within the EU.
5
 The first di-
rective promoted the idea of RE support schemes among Member States, noting that EU-
wide support schemes at that time were too early due to the limited experience with nation-
al schemes and low share of RE among the Member States.
6
 While a mandatory Communi-
ty-wide target of a 20 percent share of energy from renewable sources was set in 2007,
7
 the 
implementation of this target goal was left to the EU Member States to achieve. The 2009 
Directive introduced mandatory national targets and obliged Member States to establish 
national RE plans.
8
 The 2009 Directive specifically mentioned a need to guarantee the 
proper functioning of national support schemes in order to maintain investor confidence.
9
 
Before shifting focus to the particulars of national support schemes, it is important to look a 
bit closer at: (i) the political influence of the EU on PV solar investment policies among its 
Member States; and (ii) changes in the intra-EU investment treaty regime related to PV 
solar investments. This section will show that EU governance, expressed primarily by the 
actions of the European Commission (Commission), is presenting problems for Member 
States in regard to state aid rules and application of intra-EU investment treaties. 
                                                 
 
4
 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [1992]; Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change [1997]. 
5
 Directive (EC) 2001/77/EC of 27 September 2001 on the promotion of electricity produced from renewable 
energy sources in the internal electricity market [2001] OJ L 283/33; Directive (EC) 2009/28/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from 
renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC [2009] 
OJ L 140/16. 
6
 Directive (EC) 2001/77/EC, Recital 15. 
7
European Council Presidency Conclusions 8-9.03.2007 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/93135.pdf> accessed 30.09.2015, 21 
8
 Directive (EC) 2009/28/EC, Recitals 13, 19, Articles 3-4. 
9
 Ibid, Recital 25. 
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 EU and governance over RE investment 2.1
The European record of RE regulation includes a profound discussion over the scope of 
supranational governance and the level of convergence between national policies. Another 
dimension has a more practical character and is centered on the permissible state aid re-
quirements. Accordingly, the following section will briefly address both of these issues, 
concluding on the scope of EU governance over national RE policies. 
 Harmonization Attempts 2.1.1
In the last fifteen years, the EU and its Member States undertook two less than successful 
attempts to harmonize the support measures for RE investment at the EU level.
10
 The failed 
attempts are partly attributable to the lack of direct competence over the energy sector be-
fore the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty, and partly due to the lack of agreement between 
the EU and its Member States on the appropriate harmonization measures.
11
 The 2009 Di-
rective expressly adopted a restrictive approach
12
 towards the powers of EU to control na-
tional support schemes, thus limiting the harmonizing powers of EU as a centralized au-
thority.
13
 Nevertheless, one can say that the divergence in policies was to a certain extent 
mitigated by indirect Community-wide measures, such as the introduction of mandatory 
targets of RE shares for Member States and regulation on permissible forms of state aid. 
Harmonization in RE policies within the EU is subject to contentious debate. The elimina-
tion of distortions on the European market of RE, increased popularity of RE technologies 
and reduced costs for consumers due to competition between producers, are all named 
among the advantages of harmonization.
14
 Critical remarks include a potential rise in the 
price of support measures and disruptive effects on the RE industry caused by unpredicta-
ble regulatory changes at both the EU and Member State levels.
15
 
                                                 
 
10
 Jacobs 25-36. 
11
 Ibid. 
12
 Directive (EC) 2009/28/EC, Article 23.8. 
13
 Catherine Banet, Tradable green certificates schemes under EU law (Faculty of Law, University of Oslo 
2012) 108. 
14
 Jacobs 36-37. 
15
 Ibid 38. 
 7 
The avalanche of PV solar ITA cases seems to exploit the latter fears. What is striking here 
is that these adverse effects came into reality even without centralized harmonization 
through indirect management
16
 by the EU.  
The current situation where RE policies are being actively promoted by the EU, while at 
the same time Member States are finding themselves subject to a number of ITA disputes 
in relation to these same policies is undermining the legitimacy of the EU as supranational 
institution. One of the contemporary critiques of multilevel regulation is the impossibility 
to determine which level of regulation is responsible for a particular policy decision.
17
 
Clear allocation and use of competences has been suggested
18
 as an efficient means of 
combating the deficit of EU legitimacy, and there is some indication that the EU is moving 
in this direction. 
Furthermore, a brief comment on the suggested policy framework in the period from 2020 
to 2030 is necessary.
19
 The Commission has signaled its intent to abolish mandatory na-
tional targets in favor of single target for the whole EU, which should be collectively 
gained by all Member States.
20
 This approach is deemed to provide greater flexibility to 
Member States in designing their renewable policies. Nevertheless, the Commission wants 
to maintain a “strong European governance framework”21 through guidance and monitoring 
procedures over national plans and commitments, which shall become operational before 
2020 in order to guide Member States and encourage investors.
22
 It seems reasonable to 
expect that the joint planning process between the Commission and the Member States, 
followed by the Commission’s review of national plans, will likely help to increase harmo-
                                                 
 
16
 Ibid 201. 
17
 Andreas Føllesdal, ‘Epilogue: toward More Legitimate Multilevel Regulation’ in Andreas Føllesdal, 
Ramses A. Wessel and Jan Wouters (eds), Multilevel Regulation and the EU (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 
2008) 390. 
18
 Ibid 394-396. 
19
 Communication from the Commission COM/2014/015 A policy framework for climate and energy in the 
period from 2020 to 2030 [2014]. 
20
 Ibid 6. 
21
 Ibid 5. 
22
 Ibid 12-13. 
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nization between national support schemes, and reduce risks of abrupt regulatory policy 
changes. 
 Staid aid debate 2.1.2
As a general rule, state aid is incompatible with the internal market of the EU.
23
 Exceptions 
include cases, when such aid is recognized as permissible by the European Council (Coun-
cil) on the proposal of the Commission.
24
 In any case, the Commission should be informed 
about state aid schemes adopted by each Member State in order to determine their compat-
ibility with the internal market.
25
 
With regard to PV solar support schemes, Member States face two different options.
26
 In 
one case, the financial burden of support to RE producers is distributed among all energy 
consumers (the ratepayer option); while in other it is financed from state revenue (the tax-
payer option). It has been said
27
 that in the former case Member States have less risks to 
conflict with state aid rules, as there is no allocation of public funds by any public body. 
The increased use of RE
28
 is part of the Community’s environmental priority in providing 
more flexibility for Member States experimenting with state aid to promote RE production. 
Member States frequently refer to the Guidelines in their notifications to the Commission. 
In response, the Commission generally has supported suggested support schemes without 
any objection.
29
 
                                                 
 
23
 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012], Article 107(1). 
24
 Ibid, Article 107(3)(e). 
25
 Ibid, Article 108(3). 
26
 Jacobs 82-83; Mark Fulton and others, ‘GET FiT Program: Global Energy Transfer Feed-In Tariffs for 
Developing Countries’ (DB Climate Change Advisors, Deutsche Bank Group, 2010) 
<https://institutional.deutscheawm.com/content/_media/GET_FIT_-_042610_FINAL.pdf> accessed 
10.11.2015. 
27
 Jacobs 89-90. 
28
 Community guidelines on State aid for environmental protection [2008] OJ C 82, 1.4.2008, § 48. 
29
 See e.g. ; Communication from the Commission State aid SA.31236 (2011/N) – Ireland [2011] JOCE 
C/312/2012; Communication from the Commission State aid SA.35177 (2014/NN) – Czech Republic [2014] 
JOCE C/280/2014. 
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Moreover, the Commission signals its willingness to control national RE policies through 
the state aid mechanism. For example, in its recent Guidelines
30
 the Commission shifted 
preference from FITs to market premiums in the search of less market distortive means of 
state aid. In the long term perspective, the Commission wants to abandon subsidies for 
‘mature’ RE technologies, allowing market distortive measures only for new and underde-
veloped ones.
31
 This approach coincides with many national support schemes, which priori-
tize ‘innovative’ investments with modern technologies. However, it is not entirely clear 
yet how the ‘maturity’ of technology will be determined in the Commission’s proposal, and 
whether this requirement will be framed in absolute terms or in comparison to market com-
petitors. 
In the context of RE investment disputes, compliance with state aid requirements can be 
used as an argument for state defense.
32
 The illegality of a state aid scheme (for example, 
due to the lack of prior notifications to the Commission) may influence an investor’s stand-
ing in the proceedings. A recent study concludes
33
 that such argumentation would be not be 
recognized by an investment arbitration tribunal, except for the case when the investor was 
reasonably aware of the illegality of state aid. In this case, it would be hard to conclude that 
the investor’s expectations were legitimate. 
 PV solar investment claims and EU investment treaties 2.2
The investment treaty regime within the EU can be structured into two types of treaties: (i) 
the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT); and (i) intra-EU bilateral investment treaties (BITs) 
signed by two Member States. Both types of treaties provide the legal basis for many of the 
                                                 
 
30
 Communication from the Commission Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy 
2014-2020 [2014] OJ C 200, 124. 
31
 Communication from the Commission COM/2014/015 9. 
32
 Alexander Reuter, ‘Retroactive Reduction of Support for Renewable Energy and Investment Treaty 
Protection from the Perspective of Shareholders and Lenders’ (2015) 12 Transnational Dispute Management, 
34-41 
33
 Ibid 41. 
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PV solar ITAs, and therefore require a consistent approach from the EU.
34
 In the following 
section, the implications of these regimes for the EU and its Member States in the context 
of RE investment disputes will be considered. 
 The Energy Charter Treaty 2.2.1
The ECT is an international treaty with a predominantly European scope of application, 
which was adopted for the facilitation of energy cooperation between Eastern and Western 
European states.
35
 The application of the ECT in investment cases initially remained rather 
modest. As one prominent scholar reflected in 2010,
36
 the limited number of cases did not 
even allow identifying trends in the application of the treaty. However, the predicted
37
 
‘steady stream of cases’ due to rising investor awareness of the treaty protection available 
under the ECT is being demonstrated by the PV solar cases. As reported,
38
 in the last three 
years, the number of cases filed under the ECT has doubled, largely due to the PV solar 
claims against Spain and the Czech Republic. 
Although the scope of the treaty is limited to the energy sector,
39
 it was adopted before the 
promotion of low-carbon investment appeared predominately on the political agenda (in 
other words, it has a “pre-Kyoto” character).40 It therefore seems questionable the ECT is 
well-suited for the types of RE investments at disputes in the PV solar cases. 
                                                 
 
34
 Jan Kleinheisterkamp, ‘The next 10 year ECT investment arbitration: a vision for the future–from a 
European law perspective’ LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers, 14-16 
<https://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/WPS2011-07_Kleinheisterkamp.pdf> accessed 11.11.2015. 
35
 Kaj Hobér, ‘Investment Arbitration and the Energy Charter Treaty’ (2010) 1 Journal of International 
Dispute Settlement 153-190, 154. 
36
 Ibid 168-169. 
37
 Ibid 190. 
38
 Crina Baltag, ‘What’s New with the Energy Charter Treaty?’ (Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 2015) 
<http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2015/06/13/whats-new-with-the-energy-charter-
treaty/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+KluwerArbitrationBlogFul
l+%28Kluwer+Arbitration+Blog+-+Latest+Entries%29> accessed 31.07.2015. 
39
 Hobér 155. 
40
 Peter Cameron, ‘The Energy Charter Treaty Provisions On Low Carbon Investment’ (Energy Charter 
Secretariat, 2012) 10 <http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Publications/Low-
Carbon_Investment_2013.pdf> accessed 02.08.2015. 
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Another interesting question is the applicability of the ECT to intra-EU investment dis-
putes. The Commission is reportedly taking a strongly negative approach, declaring that the 
ECT contains an ‘implicit disconnection clause,’ which would deprive Member States from 
the dispute settlement provisions in the ECT after their accession to the EU.
41
 However, as 
evidenced in the recent EDF case,
42
 this position does not find support from arbitrators
43
 or 
domestic courts.
44
 In this matter one can only agree with the majority and reiterate that 
such serious questions as non-application of the treaty should be expressed in clear and 
unambiguous terms (especially with regard to the ECT, whose provisional application in 
the series of Yukos cases has eventually led to the biggest award in the history of invest-
ment arbitration
45
). 
 The intra-EU Bilateral Investment Treaties 2.2.2
With the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, foreign direct investment (FDI) was included in the 
Common Commercial Policy of the EU;
46
 the European Parliament and the Council were 
                                                 
 
41
 Luke Eric Peterson, ‘Investigation: In Recent Briefs, European Commission Casts Doubt on Application of 
Energy Charter Treaty to Any Intra-EU Dispute’ (IAReporter, 2014) 
<http://www.iareporter.com/articles/investigation-in-recent-briefs-european-commission-casts-doubt-on-
application-of-energy-charter-treaty-to-any-intra-eu-dispute/> accessed 10.11.2015; Luke Eric Peterson, 
‘Brussels’ Latest Intervention Casts Shadow over Investment Treaty Arbitrations Brought by Jilted Solar 
Energy Investors’ (IAReporter, 2014) <http://www.iareporter.com/articles/brussels-latest-intervention-casts-
shadow-over-investment-treaty-arbitrations-brought-by-jilted-solar-energy-investors/> accessed 10.11.2015. 
42
 EDF International S.A. v. Republic of Hungary [2014] (Tribunal ad hoc 04.12.2014). 
43
 Luke Eric Peterson, ‘Intra-EU Treaty Claims Controversy: New Decisions and Developments in Claims 
Brought by EU Investors vs. Spain and Hungary’ (IAReporter, 2014) 
<http://www.iareporter.com/articles/intra-eu-treaty-claims-controversy-new-decisions-and-developments-in-
claims-brought-by-eu-investors-vs-spain-and-hungary/> accessed 08.08.2015. 
44
 Arrêt 4A_34/2015 du 6 octobre 2015, Cour de droit civil [2015] (Tribunal Fédéral Suisse 06.10.2015); see 
also Jarrod Hepburn, ‘In Upholding Intra-EU Energy Charter Award, Swiss Court Considers EU State Aid 
Issue, as Well as Umbrella Clause Reservation and Tribunal’s Damages Methodology’ (IAReporter, 2015) 
<http://www.iareporter.com/articles/in-upholding-intra-eu-energy-charter-award-swiss-court-considers-eu-
state-aid-issue-as-well-as-umbrella-clause-reservation-and-tribunals-damages-methodology/> accessed 
10.11.2015. 
45
 Martin Dietrich Brauch, ‘Yukos v. Russia: Issues and legal reasoning behind US$50 billion awards’ (IISD, 
2014) <https://www.iisd.org/itn/2014/09/04/yukos-v-russia-issues-and-legal-reasoning-behind-us50-billion-
awards/> accessed 24.11.2015 
46
 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community [2007], § 158. 
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empowered to define its framework of implementation. The question has arisen with regard 
to investment treaties, previously concluded by the Member States.  
These treaties can be logically divided into two categories: BITs of EU Member States with 
third states (extra-EU BITs) and between themselves (intra-EU BITs). The latter were es-
pecially problematic as during the last decade the Commission has not reached an agree-
ment with Member States concerning their validity under the EU legal regime.
47
 
Fearing the due respect and the possibility that the supremacy of EU law doctrine might be 
challenged by arbitral tribunals, the Commission has intervened in a number of intra-EU 
BIT investment disputes. In all cases the arbitral tribunals were reluctant to recognize intra-
EU BITs as implicitly terminated. In the Eastern Sugar case,
48
 the Tribunal refused to ac-
cept arguments about automatic or implicit supersession of BIT by the EU legal order. In 
the Eureko case,
49
 the Tribunal rejected all objections to jurisdiction, relating to EU acces-
sion (termination of BIT due to the conclusion of subsequent treaty; inapplicability of the 
BIT due to the application of successive treaty with conflicting provisions, or due to the 
‘interpretative monopoly’ of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) over the 
dispute). The legal doctrine also regards intra-EU BITs as unaffected by accession, remark-
ing that Member States are nevertheless precluded from signing new intra-BITs.
50
 
The discussion over intra-EU BITs brings us back to the requirements of permissible state 
aid. Intervening as amicus curiae in the Micula case,
51
 the Commission submitted that the 
arbitral award under intra-BIT is likely to result in state aid in violation of Community 
                                                 
 
47
 Wenhua Shan and Sheng Zhang, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon: Half Way toward a Common Investment Policy’ 
(2010) 21 European Journal of International Law 1049-1073, 1054-1056. 
48
 Eastern Sugar B.V.(Netherlands) v. The Czech Republic [2007] Partial Award (SCC Case No. 088/2004 
27.03.2007) 32-39. 
49
 Achmea B.V. v. The Slovak Republic (formerly Eureko B.V. v. The Slovak Republic) [2010] Award on 
Jurisdiction, Arbitrability and Suspension (PCA Case No. 2008-13 26.10.2010) 60-75. 
50
 Shan and Zhang 1068. 
51
 Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula, S.C. European Food S.A, S.C. Starmill S.R.L. and S.C. Multipack S.R.L. v. 
Romania [2013] Final Award (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20 11.12.2013). 
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rules.
52
 The Tribunal rejected the argument, declaring that the enforcement matters fall 
beyond its scope of application.
53
 Similar arguments were presented by the Commission in 
the US Steel case,
54
 which was eventually discontinued due to the withdrawal of claim. 
As was reported back in 2010,
55
 the Commission was persuading Member States to termi-
nate intra-EU BITs either with immediate ending, or with a prolonged phase-out period. 
This proposal was not unanimously supported. In June 2015 the Commission initiated
56
 
infringement procedures against a handful of states (Austria, the Netherlands, Romania, 
Slovakia and Sweden) requesting that they terminate their intra-EU BITs. As ground for 
termination, the Commission mentioned an “overlap and conflict with EU single market on 
cross-border investment,” which brings “very practical consequences” of increasing num-
ber of investment arbitration claims.
57
 As an example of a particularly distortive claim, the 
press release referred to the aforementioned Micula case, where the tribunal “ignored the 
Commission’s position that such an award would infringe EU state aid rules.”58 The Com-
mission also indicated that administrative procedures would be initiated against the remain-
ing 21 Member States, and praised two states (Ireland and Italy) which had already termi-
nated their intra-EU BITs.
59
 
Furthermore, Member States themselves exercise regulatory avoidance of potential PV 
solar claims through the termination of BITs. For example, starting from 2011 Czech Re-
                                                 
 
52
 Ibid, §§ 334-336. See also subsequent correspondence on the implementation of the award: Communication 
from the Commission on State aid SA.38517(2014/C) (ex 2014/NN) – Romania [2014] OJ L 232; 
Commission Decision (EU) 2015/1470 [2015] OJ L 232. 
53
 Micula v Romania (Award), § 340. 
54
 Communication from the Commission Ref. Ares(2014)1576095 - 16/05/2014 Amicus Curiae Brief In PCA 
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public has been reportedly preparing for its PV solar investment cases by reviewing all of 
its BITs.
60
 
Chapter conclusions 
The introduction of support schemes for RE was promoted to Member States from the EU 
level. Nevertheless, due to failed harmonization attempts, the EU has had little or no direct 
influence on the overall design of national support schemes. The process of harmonization 
was conducted only through indirect mechanisms, such as the EU requirements of permis-
sible state aid. The Commission requires Member States to report on their RE incentiviza-
tion programs, and can sanction them in cases of non-compliance. The legality of RE sup-
port schemes is thus determined by the Commission. However, from the prospective of 
ITA, Member States are solely responsible for their RE policies, as promoted through a 
‘bottom-up’ approach. This situation has led to a gap between supranational governance 
and control, from one side, and responsibility and accountability, from the other side, and 
potentially undermines the legitimacy of the EU. 
The Commission also actively participates in discussions on the validity of intra-EU BITs. 
The termination of intra-EU BITs is requested by the Commission, while the powers to 
conclude and terminate such treaties are still preserved for Member States. The Commis-
sion insists on the inapplicability of the ECT and intra-EU BITs due a number of reasons, 
and it is unclear to what extent arbitral tribunals should follow the Commission’s reason-
ing. The greatest risk for the EU seems to be the independence of investment tribunals in 
interpretation and application of the EU law: one may recall that in the series of ongoing 
PV solar disputes, the Commission continues to apply for admission to the proceedings as a 
non-disputing party.
61
 The unclear status of intra-EU BITs, especially in regard to cases 
arising out of the revocation of state aid rules, leads to a high degree of uncertainty for 
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states and investors. A recent study
62
 noted the bifurcation of the Commission’s behavior: 
investors will likely hold in distrust the Commission’s promises of stable investment poli-
cy, when they are confronted with the Commission’s anti-investment rhetoric in the 
abovementioned disputes. 
Therefore, the avalanche of RE cases brings risks of legal incoherence between EU law and 
international investment law. It may be concluded that Member States cannot do whatever 
they want in relation to their RE support schemes. They are being guided by the Commis-
sion, who is interfering both in regard to how states incentivize RE, but also in how Mem-
ber States are supposed to respond to intra-EU BIT cases filed against them. Facing this 
crisis on the EU level, one may find it useful to descend on the national level in order to see 
what policies triggered the avalanche; and it is upon these issues that this thesis now turns. 
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3 Case study: Renewable investment policies in EU Member 
States 
Following the promotion both on the international and the EU levels, states started to adopt 
RE incentivization policies to attract investors. Their legislation developed through the 
enforcement of Directives, being characterized as an “EU-induced matrix.”63 The incen-
tives offered to date have included certain lucrative promises of stable support for energy 
producers for a considerable period of time (i.e., through FITs). Maintaining these incen-
tives for some Member States has become difficult. At a certain turning point the increased 
amount of support measures became either devastating for the state budget or unbearably 
high for consumers. However, the adopted mitigating policies have run counter to inves-
tor’s expectations protected under investment treaties and are currently being challenged 
before different ITA tribunals. 
Four states have been selected for the case study. The first one is Germany, which was a 
pioneer in RE promotion, and has managed to regulate RE support schemes fairly smoothly 
without any known ITA claims. Three other examples (Spain, Italy and the Czech Repub-
lic) are the states that have attracted the majority of the disputes to date. The policies of all 
four states are worth comparing in order to identify their implications on investment cases 
and justify this difference in the number of ITA claims each state has attracted. 
 Germany 3.1
Being traditionally cautious about risky nuclear energy, Germany eventually became the 
major promoter of RE in Europe. The regulation of support schemes for RE investments 
has come a long way from their beginnings in the early 1990’s, and to date seems to be the 
most developed in Europe. 
In 1991, Germany adopted the Electricity Feed-In Law (Stromeinspeisungsgesetz),
64
 which 
obliged electricity suppliers to purchase the energy produced from RE sources with a cer-
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tain amount of remuneration. The law was further amended in 1998.
65
 The lack of notifica-
tion to the Commission concerning these amendments resulted in the notorious 
PreussenElektra case before the ECJ,
66
 where the Court declared that the provisions oblig-
ing private entities to purchase RE under non-market conditions did not violate Community 
law on state aid.
67
 Moreover, the Court specifically underlined the public importance of RE 
production for the Community’s goals of environmental protection and combating climate 
change.
68
 Since then, Germany has expressed a cautious approach towards state aid rules, 
which is preserved till the present day.
69
 
The next milestone appeared in 2000 with the adoption of the Renewable Energy Sources 
Act (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz EEG).
70
 The minimal FIT was adopted in the amount 
of 45,7 €cent/kWh (kilowatt per hour).71 The incentives were promised for new installa-
tions for a period of 20 years, and for existing installations starting from the year 2000.
72
 
Thus, it is worth noting that positive effects of the Act applied with retroactive force for the 
period of three months for the projects installed before its adoption. The tariff review pro-
cedure was envisaged for every two years.
73
 
Four years later, a new law
74
 was adopted in response to Directive 2001/77/EC. The law 
included a number of new provisions: (i) the obligation of priority access to the grid, (ii) 
requirements of transparency in remuneration process, (iii) guarantees of origin and (iv) a 
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ban on double marketing of energy. The law envisaged a four year review procedure
75
 and 
preserved application of previous law for installations brought before 2000 and 2004.
76
 
Adopted in 2008, a new piece of legislation (EEG 2009)
77
 played a vital regulatory role by 
timely responding to the boost in PV solar investments. Amendments included the positive 
obligation of network operators to adjust the network capacity to the amount of supply,
78
 
the gradual annual reduction of tariff rates and bonuses for new installations,
79
 as well as, a 
lower default rate of 21,1 €cent/kWh for PV solar projects.80  
The cost-cutting of solar panels was reflected in the 2010 amendment to the law,
81
 which 
increased the reductions of tariff rates for new solar projects. The latter amendment was 
challenged in the German Constitutional Court as being contrary to investor’s legitimate 
expectations.
82
 The Court rejected the appeal, stressing that the retrospective amendments 
were necessary in order to maintain the regulatory freedom of the legislator to adopt legal 
systems for new circumstances.
83
 
EEG 2009 was substantially reviewed in 2012.
84
 It contained further reductions for pro-
spective solar installations (e.g. lack of support for installations on conservation areas
85
). 
After less than a year, a new amendment dealing specifically with PV solar investments 
was introduced (the PV Novelle).
86
 The law introduced a capacity corridor for prospective 
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subsidized PV solar investments between 2500 and 3500 MW (megawatts) per calendar 
year.
87
 New installments needed to enter the corridor in order to claim state support. The 
Federal Network Agency (Bundesnetzagentur) was held responsible for monthly updates 
on newly installed PV solar capacity as well as the total current capacity on its website.
88
 
Further tariff rate reductions depended
89
 on the published capacity: the less capacity was 
left, the bigger the reductions. The law also provided a cap on total produced energy
90
 in 
the amount of 52 000 MW, which precluded further incentives for new projects once 
reached. All that helped to keep investors updated about the available state support, and 
avoid unrealistic promises. 
The default tariff rate for PV solar investments was further lowered to 13,5 €cent/kWh and 
covered only big investments (with capacity equal or higher 10 MW).
91
 The PV Novelle 
was set retroactively applicable to investments installed as of 1 April 2012, provided that 
their commissioning had not yet been completed.
92
 This retroactive application was not 
surprising for the market, which was aware of these negotiations in the German Parlia-
ment.
93
  
The latest amendment to the Renewable Energy Sources Act was adopted in July 2014.
94
 
The gradual monthly reductions of tariff rates were firmly tied to the amount of available 
capacity in the corridor (which was set between 2,4 and 2,6 MW per year).
95
 Tariffs for 
new installations were reduced by 0,5 percent on a monthly basis, with their review in 
comparison to the available capacity every three months. It is worth mentioning that the 
amendments were adopted after two rounds of public consultations, and the positions of 
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stakeholders were published on the web.
96
 Moreover, the scheme received positive re-
sponse from the Commission and was declared compatible with the internal market.
97
 
 Spain 3.2
The majority of current PV solar investment claims are filed against Spain.
98
 This influx 
was likely caused by the inflexible regulation and overestimation of incentive capabilities. 
While the line of regulatory acts is impressive, it may be noted that only a few initial acts 
were aimed at the promotion of RE investments. All subsequent legislative and regulatory 
acts adopted by Spain were targeted at mitigating or scaling back the original incentives on 
offer and it is the consequences of these regulatory changes that form the basis for all of the 
ITA claims against Spain.  
One of the earliest Spanish laws dealing with RE investments was adopted in 1997.
99
 The 
law prescribed
100
 that electricity tariffs should be established by Royal Decree and re-
viewed annually. All producers of electricity were subject
101
 to mandatory registration and 
authorization (in later decrees this provision was stressed for RE producers). The latter fell 
under the ‘special regime’ (régimen especial) and permitted special remuneration for RE 
supplied to the grid.
102
 The remuneration was established in the form of a feed-in premium 
(FIP) – an additional payment within the pre-defined tariff rates for the surplus energy re-
ceived from RE sources. A specific arrangement
103
 was introduced for PV solar energy, in 
relation to which the Government was authorized to increase FIPs beyond the statutory 
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limits. Nevertheless the law authorized the Government to limit the supply from RE 
sources in exceptional circumstances “when the power supply conditions so require.”104 
A 2004 Decree
105
 introduced significant positive amendments to the incentive scheme. 
Two mechanisms of remuneration
106
 were adopted at the discretion of the RE installation 
operator: (i) a set FIT or (ii) incentivized distribution at the market price. The incentives 
consisted of a bonus for market participation and a FIP, both indicated in percentage of the 
established statutory tariff rate.
107
 With regard to PV solar investments, the Decree differ-
entiated installations by their power capacity and promised higher tariff rate for the first 25 
years from the moment of launch and slightly reduced rates thereafter.
108
 Larger installa-
tions were also incentivized by FIPs and market bonuses. 
The 2004 Decree provided stable guarantees for revision procedures.
109
 The rates were 
suggested to be reviewed every four years from 2006. Retroactive reduction for existing 
projects was expressly prohibited. The revised tariffs should have been adopted by Royal 
Decrees before the end of the year preceding their entry into force. It may be concluded 
that the 2004 Decree maintained investors’ expectations on a high level, and gave no 
doubts for adverse consequences for those who already came on the market. 
Nevertheless, in 2007 the Decree was replaced by an even more lucrative and investor-
promising one.
110
 The main features of the new Decree included: (i) a shift from FIPs to 
fixed FIT rates (maintaining the premiums turned out to be too expensive for the Govern-
ment
111
); and (ii) a high capacity target of 371 MW
112
 for PV generation up to the next re-
vision in 2010. With the installation of 85 percent of the projected target, the surplus remu-
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neration for new projects was frozen for the length of a certain transitional period, neces-
sary for the introduction of new capacity targets.
113
 
The FIT rates for PV solar projects
114
 did not change significantly, providing 44 €cent/kWh 
in their highest (for small projects, with capacity equal or less than 100 kW), and 20 per-
cent lower rates for the lifetime of project after initial 25 year period. The exception was 
made for the middle-size projects (with capacity between 100 kW and 10 MW), where re-
muneration increased by more than 82 percent.
115
 
According to statistics,
116
 the lucrative incentives of the 2007 Decree led to the boom in PV 
solar investment. The annual installed PV solar capacity increased five and 26 times in 
years 2007 and 2008 respectively in comparison to the pre-amendment year of 2006. In 
2009 the capacity dropped to zero, and revived to modest levels thereafter. It follows that 
the dramatic increase in PV solar installations occurred during a few short months (several 
times the monthly installation rates exceeded 500 MW).  
The mitigation measures came only 1,5 years after with the adoption of a 2008 Decree.
117
 
Its preamble explained that due to the unexpected high growth in the PV solar sector, the 
85 percent threshold of capacity planned for 2010 was apparently reached in less than three 
months. Furthermore, the 2008 Decree introduced two measures worth mentioning. First, 
the 2008 Decree introduced a pre-allocation register (registro de preasignación de 
retribución)
118
 for new installations applying for compensation. Second, the period of re-
muneration was fixed at 25 years after either commissioning of the project or inclusion in 
the register.
119
 Under this 2008 Decree, new incoming PV solar investors would be put on 
notice that support for PV solar would only be available for a set period of time.
120
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Further legislative changes came with two 2010 Decrees: 1565/2010
121
 and 14/2010.
122
 
These Decrees lowered the FIT rates for prospective projects and with the retroactive force 
abandoned surplus tariff rates for installed projects starting from 26 year after the installa-
tion.
123
 These Decrees also extended these lower FIT rates by enlarging the guaranteed 
period from 25 to 28 years,
124
 but in doing so adopted further restricting measures as well. 
These Decrees also retroactively set both existing and prospective projects to regional caps 
on operating hours.
125
 
Installation of new PV solar projects was effectively prevented by a 2012 Decree,
126
 which 
abandoned all forms of remuneration to them. Spectacularly, its preamble mentioned sig-
nificant drop in demand for electricity and favorable weather conditions as grounds for the 
correction to the eligible tariff. A further law was passed in 2012, Law 15/2012,
127
 which 
adopted a seven percent tax for the production and feeding of PV solar generated electricity 
into the grid. The tax was imposed on all existing PV solar energy producers, and was fur-
ther challenged
128
 before the Spanish Constitutional Court as being allegedly discriminato-
ry to particular types of energy producers. The Court rejected the challenge appealing to the 
legislator’s significant margin of appreciation. 
A 2013 Decree Law
129
 changed the basis for calculations of all FITs to a more stable stand-
ard. The measure was intended to freeze the growth of FITs and could even lead to their 
reduction in real terms.
130
 A second law was passed in 2013, Decree Law 9/2013,
131
 which 
limited the internal rate of return for PV solar projects, lowering their rentability and mak-
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ing them unprofitable.
132
 
The new energy paradigm was introduced by the Law 24/2013
133
 and the Decree 
413/2014.
134
. These laws admitted significant progress towards Spain’s climate change 
goals by means of RE. Nevertheless, the laws admitted the difficulties connected with the 
growth of PV solar installments, and abandoned the special regime for RE energy sources. 
The uniform regulation provided an amended support mechanism. The compensation to RE 
installments was accorded if the income received made it impossible to compete with con-
ventional sources and their production costs could not be recovered without such compen-
sation.
135
 
It may be concluded that the peculiarities of the Spanish regulatory regime in regard to PV 
solar support originated from the over-promised support measures that attracted many in-
vestors and the inability of state to reduce the rates once too many of them came in. In light 
of the Spanish situation, it is important to note that the domestic court system of Spain has 
so far been unsympathetic to PV solar investors and may be responsible for pushing them 
towards international dispute settlement. 
 Italy 3.3
The structural differences of the Italian energy scheme can be traced to early 1990’s. Arti-
cle 22 of the Law 9/1991
136
 allowed the Interministerial Price Committee (Comitato inter-
ministeriale dei prezzi (CIP)) to adopt prices for RE and set the conditions for its supply. 
The adopted Resolution 6/1992
137
 established a specific support mechanism: the incentives 
for RE were born directly by consumers. In response to the Directive 2001/77/EC, the Ital-
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ian Government adopted Legislative Decree 387/03,
138
 which formed the legal framework 
for RE sources and simplified the bureaucratic mechanisms for producers. 
The regulation of PV solar projects started with the first Energy Bill (Conto Energia), 
adopted by the Ministry of Industrial Activities (Ministero delle attività produttive) in 
2005.
139
 The First Conto Energia prescribed fixed tariff rates for PV solar investments 
(amounting to 44,5 €cent/kWh for individuals and 44,5 to 49 €cent/kWh for companies) for 
the period of 20 years. Notably, the First Conto Energia set the caps for all subsidized na-
tional energy capacity, which were increased by an amendment
140
 the following year. 
The Second Conto Energia
141
 was adopted for further promotion of PV solar investments. 
The tariffs were guaranteed in a range between 36 and 49 €cent/kWh,142 depending on the 
size and type of the installation. Additional premiums were adopted for installations with 
efficient use of energy. The national target for PV solar installations was set at 3000 MW 
by 2016.
143
 It is worth mentioning that the law prescribed gradual annual reduction of tariff 
rates by two percent for future installations, starting from 1 January 2009.
144
 
At the same time, the promotion of PV solar investments also stepped down to the regional 
level without express authorization from centralized authorities. For example, the Italian 
region of Puglia adopted a law,
145
 which simplified the application procedure for PV solar 
plants with capacity up to one MW.
146
 Two years after the Italian Constitutional Court de-
clared
147
 this law was rendered unconstitutional as contradicting the provisions of republi-
can law and giving unlawful preferences to investors in the Puglia region. The regional 
experiment was found harmful to the broader state interests and was therefore discontinued. 
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The Third Conto Energia
148
 was adopted in 2010 and signaled the beginning of decline of 
support schemes. The preamble to the law specifically mentioned the reduction in prices of 
solar panels, which happened since 2007. The national target of PV solar electricity pro-
duction was set at 8000 MW by 2020.
149
 Both existing and prospective installations were 
still promised incentives for 20 years.
150
 The authorized governmental body was under a 
duty to publish and regularly update the information of available capacity on its website.
151
 
The Third Conto Energia was applied for only five months, and in May 2011 was substitut-
ed by the next regulation (Forth Conto Energia
152
). The scheme introduced a gradual reduc-
tion mechanism for prospective installations, with rates changed monthly starting from 
June 2011.
153
 The Forth Conto Energia also changed the focus of support towards smaller 
installations, which was criticized as “unjustified treatment disparity” between RE produc-
ers of different scale.
154
 
After a year, the last incentive scheme (Fifth Conto Energia
155
) was adopted, reserving a 
cap amount of funds (€ 6,7 billion) which could be spent annually on PV solar subsidies. 
The Fifth Conto Energia entered into force in the end of August 2012, and ceased to apply 
30 days after this amount was exhausted in July 2013.
156
 Further regulatory amendments 
have also been implemented and seem to distract investors from PV solar sector towards 
other types of RE investment, and even more conventional types of energy (i.e. fossil 
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fuels).
157
 
In 2014, the situation regarding support to PV solar producers continued to deteriorate. The 
Decree Law 91/2014 on incentive spreading
158
 (spalma incentivi
159
) represented an “emer-
gency legislative intervention”160 relating to a significant budgetary crisis for the Italian 
Government. Due to its temporary application, this Decree Law was later converted into 
law.
161
 Among other cost-cutting measures, the law provides for the reduction of electricity 
bills for consumers
162
 and retroactive changes to the FIT rates for large-scale PV solar pro-
ducers (with capacity of 200 kW and higher).
163
 The change allows three options for inves-
tors starting from 1 January 2015. All of them reduce the existing subsidies through differ-
ent time periods and rate arrangements. The law also promises to secure investors’ interests 
by providing bank loans in the differentiating amount between the initial rates and the re-
calculated ones. The loan conditions are to be established separately by Ministerial De-
cree,
164
 which was not adopted in appropriate time.
165
 
All investors in PV solar projects in Italy were left with the choice between possible op-
tions, all of which modified retrospectively their original support schemes.
166
 It is needless 
to say that such emergency arrangements ran contrary to their expectations, based on pre-
vious legislative promises. 
                                                 
 
157
 Massari 11. 
158
 Decreto-legge No. 91, 24.06.2014, GU No. 144 del 24.06.2014. 
159
 Massari 7. 
160
 Behn and Fauchald 126. 
161
 Legge No. 116, GU No. 192 del 20.08.2014. 
162
 Law 91/2014, Article 23. 
163
 Ibid, Article 26(3). 
164
 Ibid, Article 26(5). 
165
 Massari 8. 
166
 Dörte Fouquet and Jana Viktoria Nysten, ‘Retroactive and retrospective changes and moratoria to RES 
support’ (KeepOnTrack.EU, 2015) 19 
<http://www.keepontrack.eu/contents/publicationsbiannualnationalpolicyupdatesversions/policy-briefing6-
retroactive-and-retrospective-changes-and-moratoria-to-res-support.pdf> accessed 08.11.2015. 
 28 
 The Czech Republic 3.4
The case of the Czech Republic is particularly interesting due to their accession to the EU 
in 2004, which resulted in the prolonged adoption of RE legislation and delayed fulfillment 
of national RE targets. According to early pre-accession arrangements,
167
 the Energy Regu-
latory Office (ERO) was obliged to disclose suggested electricity tariffs for public discus-
sion. 
Decree 252/2001
168
 introduced an obligation for grid operators to purchase energy obtained 
from renewable sources on the basis of a negotiated price. The support scheme was quite 
moderate and did not result in increased investment.
169
 
Law 180/2005
170
 was adopted in order to implement Directive 2001/77/EC, setting the 
basic conditions for RE investments. Producers were granted
171
 a choice between purchase 
prices for electric energy (FITs) and green bonuses (FIPs). The FITs were guaranteed for 
the period of 15 years.
172
 Notably, the law prescribed
173
 that decrease of the FIT could not 
be lower than 95 percent of the FIT active in the previous year (starting from the year 
2007). The ERO was obliged
174
 to publish annual information reports on the amount of 
installed RE projects, their impact on consumers and progress in achieving national energy 
goals. Further changes of RE support scheme were adopted as amendments to the Law 
180/2005. 
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The amendment Law 137/2010
175
 lifted the limits for annual price reduction under certain 
conditions. The Law 330/2010
176
 limited access to support schemes only for existing instal-
lations starting from 1 March 2011. A new tax levy
177
 was introduced solely for PV solar 
projects which were put in operation in 2009 and 2010. The levy was set at the rate of 26 
percent for FITs and 28 percent for FIPs, and was set effective between 2011 and 2013. 
Low-scale projects (up to 30 kW) were exempted from the tax. The law also introduced
178
 
state support for transmission system operators to cover the extra costs of RE incentives. 
The retroactive application of the tax levy was challenged by a group of senators before the 
Czech Constitutional Court. In a 2012 decision,
179
 the Court extensively relied on compara-
tive judicial practice of RE cases in European states. Discussing the levy, the Court drew 
the distinction between the concepts of ‘true’ and ‘false’ retroactivity.180 According to 
Court, ‘true retroactivity’ appears when the new rule changes a previously existing legal 
framework, while ‘false retroactivity’ does not change the prior framework, but modifies 
future legal relations arising from some past events (a simplier distinction can be made 
between ‘retroactivity’ and ‘retrospectivity’ and will be discussed in the next chapter). The 
Court concluded that the application of ‘true retroactivity’ was generally restricted, while 
its ‘false’ counterpart could be justified both under the Czech constitutional law and the 
European Convention on Human Rights, if it does not violate the legitimate expectations of 
investors.
181
 In the case of tax levy, the Court found that the tax was one of ‘false retroac-
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tivity’. The Court suggested taking into account the concrete economic situation in the state 
which preceded the adoption of the levy,
182
 and concluded that even despite the levy the 
statutory guarantees for return on investment were maintained.
183
 Notably, the Court also 
suggested that an abstract review of constitutionality may not foresee all potential situa-
tions with investments, which need to be settled by courts on an individual basis.
184
  
In 2012, Law 180/2005 was superseded by a new law,
185
 which was adopted following the 
issuance of Directive 2009/28/EC. The law specifically mentioned withdrawal from PV 
solar electricity as one of its goals,
186
 and provided support only for low-scale rooftop in-
stallations.
187
 Provisions concerning the tax levy were also included in the new law.
188
 
In the end of 2013, the tax levy was changed.
189
 In the new redaction, it was set at lower 
numbers (10 percent for FITs, and 11 percent for FIPs), but for a longer period of time: 
from 1 January 2014 till the end of subsidized period of a project. The change covered only 
those installations which became operational during the year 2010. Notably, the Law aban-
doned support for the majority of other prospective RE investments,
190
 except those which 
were planned to become operational before 2016. 
The most recently published tariff rates
191
 for electricity from PV solar projects show a 
range of FITs and FIPs applicable to installations set before 2014. The highest amounts of 
these subsidies were provided for installations made between 2006 and 2011. After 2011, 
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the prices were gradually reduced, so that the latest installments can receive approximately 
one-seventh of the abovementioned highest amounts. 
Chapter conclusions 
This overview shows many similarities of states’ RE policies in the PV solar sector. Initial 
support schemes provided high tariff rates, which were promised for the period of 15 to 25 
years, and envisaged rather relaxed review procedures every four years. Previous studies
192
 
show a certain degree of policy convergence among European states in relation to their PV 
solar investment support schemes. Some have suggested that this convergence successfully 
evolved despite failed harmonization at the EU level. 
This case study views focused on the changes made to laws and regulation as a result of 
over-subsidization and the dramatic reduction in the costs of PV solar panels. States re-
sponded with different types of strategies to remedy the problem of over-incentivization. 
The policy fluctuations ultimately resulted in reduced or abandoned state support for PV 
solar investments and an avalanche of PV solar claims before ITA tribunals. 
The German legislative history shows cautious attention towards RE policies. The novel 
mechanisms of regulation (such as capacity caps, energy corridors and progressive annual 
and monthly reductions) were early introduced for new investments, and did not undermine 
the position of existing investors, who were enjoying their 20 year fixed FIT rates. The 
regulatory system managed to conquer the ‘solar bubble’ and actively respond to market 
challenges efficiently. Furthermore, German regulatory bodies monitored the interests of 
stakeholders, involving their participation and ensured compliance with EU state aid rules. 
All these measures resulted in the status quo: to date, there are no PV solar investment 
claims against Germany. 
The three other states in the case study have not been as efficient in responding to the ‘solar 
bubble’. For Spain it took more than 1,5 years to implement mitigating measures, which 
significantly impaired the interests of investors by introducing time-limitations on prom-
ised support and a new solar tax. Similar impairments were observed in Italy and Czech 
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Republic. Initially generous support for large PV solar farms shifted towards smaller ones, 
often with retroactive or retrospective effect. These states also lacked good mechanisms for 
limiting the amount of admitted investments; by the time they realized that too many pro-
jects had been admitted, they had no way to limit the amount of subsidies given to these 
entities without retrospectively or retroactively reducing the incentives initially on offer. 
This explains why the majority of PV solar investment cases relate to what states have done 
to investors that were already online and receiving the subsidy. It is the attempts to limit the 
subsidies for these investments that are the subject of the disputes. In all cases, the abrupt 
nature of deprivatory measures resulted in domestic and international claims against the 
state, which – to date – have found no support in domestic courts. Therefore, it was a com-
bination of lack of forecasting, unresponsiveness to external factors, inadequate remedies in 
domestic courts and a lack of regulatory flexibility which has resulted in the avalanche of 
PV solar ITA claims. 
In conclusion, a few other European states (such as Bulgaria, Romania and Greece) are 
currently making changes to their support schemes. It is highly probable, that if they are not 
careful and do not take into account aforementioned examples, they may also attract ITA 
cases in the future. 
 33 
4 Facing the avalanche of renewable energy investment claims 
The policy overview shows that foreign investors in PV solar projects were deprived from 
the conditions which were promised to them. The deprivation was often conducted in an 
abrupt manner, with retroactive effect and without consultations with stakeholders. In this 
section, ITA will be discussed in some detail by: (i) briefly describing the universe of PV 
solar investment claims against EU Member States; (ii) defining the relevant standards 
provided in investment treaties, which may be invoked by investors; (iii) focusing on the 
fair and equitable treatment (FET) standard by analyzing how it could be violated in these 
cases; and (iv)suggesting potential explanations for the divergent and diverse number of 
cases filed against different states. 
 The storm is coming: PV solar claims against EU Member States 4.1
The task of monitoring PV solar investment claims today reminds the review of a battle-
field. New pins on the map symbolize new claims, and their congregation forms several 
fronts stretched throughout the sunny south of Europe. As of mid-November 2015 there are 
39 PV solar investment cases known, and this number will continue to grow.  
It shall be noted that the description of recently filed and pending cases brings one method-
ological limitation. In the absence of actual decisions (none of the 39 cases have reached 
decisions as of mid-November 2015), second-hand evidence about these cases must be re-
lied upon: case descriptions on the websites of arbitral institutions and various news re-
sources. 
In this section, analysis of the cases will not look at the specific states;
 193
 but will instead 
focus on a brief descriptive analysis of similarities between PV solar investment cases, and 
try to explain the differences. The graphical representation of these findings are provided in 
the Annex. 
Beginning with the respondent side of the dispute, evidence shows that the majority of 
known PV solar investment claims have been filed against Spain, the Czech Republic, Italy 
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and Bulgaria (Annex, Figure 1). Over two thirds of known claims have been filed against 
Spain.  
Furthermore, the cases all show interesting timing similarities. The earliest known case was 
registered in 2011 and the latest in November 2015 (Annex, Figure 2). No cases were filed 
in 2012. Half of all claims were filed in 2015; and all of these are Spanish or Italian cases. 
Studies show,
194
 that the global reduction in the price of PV solar panels occurred between 
2007 and 2009. The lag between these dates and the influx of cases after 2011 may be ex-
plained by the attempts of investors to exhaust local remedies before bringing disputes to 
ITA, prolonged negotiations or collection of evidence. 
Another interesting peculiarity is the home state of investor. The largest number of claims 
(27 percent) has been filed by German investors, followed by companies incorporated in 
Luxembourg and Netherlands (23 and 13 percent, respectively; see Annex, Figure 3). It 
shall be noted that so-called ‘postbox’ companies are frequently used in the course of cor-
porate and investment structuring, and may not reflect the original nationality of the parent 
company or of individual investors. With regard to PV solar investments, such examples 
include the RENERGY case
195
 (claimant was founded by a Mexican national
196
), the CSP 
Equity Investment case
197
 (claimant is a Luxembourg subsidiary of the Spanish company 
Abengoa
198
) and the Masdar Solar & Wind Cooperatief UA case
199
 (parent company regis-
tered in United Arab Emirates
200
). 
Speaking about the legal instruments invoked by investors (Annex, Figure 4), more than 
two thirds of the claims are based on the ECT. The remaining one third of cases are based 
on the ECT and an intra-EU BIT. There are no claims based exclusively on a BIT.  
                                                 
 
194
 David Feldman and others, ‘Photovoltaic (PV) Pricing Trends: Historical, Recent, and Near-Term 
Projections’ (U.S. Department of Energy, 2012) <http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy13osti/56776.pdf> accessed 
22.10.2015, 3. 
195
 RENERGY S.à r.l. v. Kingdom of Spain (ICSID Case No. ARB/14/18). 
196
 Tirado 19. 
197
 CSP Equity Investment S.à.r.l. v. Kingdom of Spain (Arbitration Institute of the SCC). 
198
 Tirado 16. 
199
 Masdar Solar & Wind Cooperatief U.A. v. Kingdom of Spain (ICSID Case No. ARB/14/1). 
200
 Tirado 18. 
 35 
With regard to the dispute settlement forum (Annex, Figure 5), one may note that the larg-
est number of claims (69 percent) has been brought before the International Center for Set-
tlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Other popular options are ad hoc arbitration in 
accordance with the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, ad hoc arbitrations administered by the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA); and claims brought before the Arbitration Institute 
of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC). 
Lastly, a notable peculiarity is the low variety among legal counsel (Annex, Figures 6 and 
7) representing claimants in these cases. The largest number of claims are being represent-
ed on the claimant side of the dispute by the global law firms of Allen & Overy and King & 
Spalding; and national law firms, ArbLit – Radicati di Brozolo Sabatini and Cuatrecasas 
Gonçalves Pereira. These firms acting for claimants in PV solar investment cases may be 
further classified as ‘acting internationally’ (retained as counsel in PV solar disputes in 
several jurisdictions) and ‘acting locally’ (concentrating on one particular jurisdiction). The 
former include such firms as Allen & Overy and King & Spalding, while the latter include 
Herbert Smith Freehills (Spain) and Weil Gotshall & Manges (the Czech Republic). 
These claims are receiving increasing attention from affected states. A wide-quoted exam-
ple
201
 from the year 2011 mentions that the Czech Republic abandoned its policy of public 
tender proceedings for representation in international disputes and instead formed a ‘dream 
team’ of high-profile arbitrators for the sole purpose of combatting its PV solar claims. 
However, the increasing caseload has positive meaning as well: it has been suggested
202
 
that some states might not revoke support schemes for fear of becoming subject to ITA 
claims. Such a positive ‘chilling effect’ might positively impact environmental policies that 
seek promoting RE. 
Another consequence includes the increasing attention of law firms. PV solar disputes offer 
good revenue for investment lawyers, who can represent claimants in one or several juris-
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dictions. A relevant example was recently noted in the Czech Republic, where a national 
law boutique promoted aggressive legal advertisement for PV solar investors.
203
 It can also 
happen to two abovementioned international law firms, which are currently dominating on 
the PV solar market. 
To conclude, the analysis shows a growing body of cases, which have many similarities. 
Some similarities can be explained relatively easily (the limited choice of forum or legal 
instrument, which is typical for intra-EU disputes), and some will require additional re-
search when more factual data becomes available. Another distinct issue is the choice and 
appointment of arbitrators, who also seem to lack diversity in PV solar investment cases 
and show repeated appointments;
204
 a thorough analysis of this issue will be possible once 
the procedure of tribunal constitution is finalized in current disputes. 
 The relevant standards of investment treaties 4.2
As stated in the previous section, the majority of RE investment claims are currently filed 
under the ECT, with only few claimants invoking intra-EU BITs. For this reason, one may 
presume that the number of relevant substantive guarantees invoked does not differ signifi-
cantly between the disputes. 
A previous study
205
 suggests that the number of guarantees which could be potentially in-
fringed in PV solar cases based on the ECT
206
 include provisions on direct, indirect and 
partial expropriation, the FET standard and the umbrella clause. The study concluded that 
the FET standard is best suited due to the specific peculiarities of RE reduction schemes.
207
 
While this speculation is reasonable, it is also necessary for the purposes of this study to 
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briefly introduce the applicability of relevant standards, abstracting from exact treaty provi-
sions. Confining one’s analysis to the ECT forecloses the differences in protection stand-
ards that might be available under intra-EU BITs.  
In this section, an analysis of the following standards of protection will be discussed: (i) the 
FET standard; (ii) prohibition against indirect expropriation; (iii) non-discrimination provi-
sions; and the (iv) umbrella clause. 
 The fair and equitable treatment (FET) standard 4.2.1
The FET standard provides with the broadest coverage of activities in comparison to other 
standards and frequently forms the basis of investment treaty claims.
208
 Breach of the FET 
standard forms the majority of claims recognized in ITA to date.
209
 The PV solar claims 
emerge from a sudden change of state policies and are likely to follow this tradition. 
The all-embracing nature of the FET standard poses questions with regard to its precise 
meaning and content. It has been stated that the standard is too case-specific and cannot be 
assessed in the abstract.
210
 Nevertheless, practical considerations call for certain classifica-
tion. Tribunals tend to identify certain subgroups within the standard, but they lack a uni-
form approach.
211
 
In arbitral tribunal jurisprudence, it has been suggested that the FET standard could be clas-
sified as embracing a number of partly overlapping criteria, which include: (i) good faith 
and consistency of conduct; (ii) transparency and purposefulness of legal rules; (iii) com-
pliance with the due process; (iv) absence of arbitrary, discriminative or harassing behavior 
on behalf of the state; and inter alia (v) “a reasonable degree of stability and predictability 
of the legal system together with the recognition of the investors’ legitimate expecta-
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tions.”212 
Empirical evidence provided in the previous suggests that the latter criterion is likely to be 
the most debated one. Indeed, in abruptly changing its support schemes, states may have 
undermined the trustworthiness of their legal systems, and caused disturbance in the flow 
of investment. The violations of legitimate expectations will be discussed in the next sec-
tion. 
 Indirect expropriation 4.2.2
In case of indirect expropriation, the property title remains unchanged, but its enjoyment 
appears limited.
213
 According to an earlier study, the revocation of preferable FITs and 
change of support schemes can represent indirect expropriation.
214
 Indeed, in the majority 
of PV solar claims, states granted investors certain vested rights, which were later infringed 
by subsequent legislation. This discussion poses a two-fold question: whether these chang-
es were performed within the scope of state regulatory authority and whether they shall be 
deemed compensable? 
The state legal framework is never static and shall be adjusted to new challenges. Condi-
tions created by earlier legislation can be narrowed down due to budgetary needs. For ex-
ample, in the Oscar Chinn case the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) did not 
recognize protected vested right in “favorable business conditions,” noting that they are 
“transient circumstances, subject to inevitable changes.”215 Therefore the reductions may 
not constitute indirect expropriation if they resulted from genuine regulatory action. 
That brings us to the second part of the question, namely, the emerging doctrine of regula-
tory expropriation. Accordingly, arbitral tribunals
216
 seem to agree that measures which 
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were adopted on a non-discriminatory basis for the purposes of general regulation do not 
constitute expropriation and thus shall not be compensated. Empirical evidence shows that 
the reasons for the tariff reductions were budgetary needs, which are within a state’s police 
powers. The question thus is in the manner of implementation (i.e. its proportionality, non-
discriminatory application and compliance with due process), which shall be assessed on a 
case-by-case basis. 
Finally, a relatively recent development is that the notion of legitimate expectations has 
appeared in the discussion on indirect expropriation (i.e. it is not a notion confined to anal-
ysis under the FET standard).
217
 Given that this criterion originates in and partially overlaps 
with the FET standard, it is not necessary to elaborate further on the concept of legitimate 
expectations in regard to indirect expropriation due to the general preference of ITA tribu-
nals
218
 for the competing and more flexible FET standard. 
 Non-Discrimination 4.2.3
Non-discrimination provisions are traditionally included as separate protections in invest-
ment treaties, and they can also form part of the FET standard. Under these provisions, 
states are obliged to treat foreign investors no less favorably than their own investors and 
investors from third states. 
It has been suggested
219
 that the RE policies of EU Member States may constitute discrimi-
natory treatment for two reasons. Firstly, because of the local content requirement included 
in some support schemes: the FIT schemes in France, Italy, Greece and Croatia grant addi-
tional bonuses to those producers who used equipment of EU origin. Second, because of a 
local consumption requirement: when the produced energy should be purchased by the lo-
cal electricity distributor in order to receive FIT incentives. In support of these allegations, 
it is worth noting that the local content requirement of the Italian support scheme was re-
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cently challenged
220
 by China in the WTO dispute settlement body as a trade-distortive 
discriminatory measure.
221
 
 Umbrella clause 4.2.4
An umbrella clause guarantees the observance of state contractual and other commitments 
towards the investor, and brings them under investment treaty protection.
222
 This clause is 
often included in investment treaties, but began to receive attention fairly recently in the 
last 15 years.
223
 
The academic debate concerning the application of umbrella clause is centered on the form 
and scope of commitments. Initially, arbitral tribunals
224
 tended towards a broad interpreta-
tion covering all types of commitments. Indeed, a restrictive interpretation
225
 which ex-
cludes non-contractual obligations because of potential flood of lawsuits remains a highly 
criticized and isolated one.
226
 The current arbitral jurisprudential trend seems to recognize a 
distinction between acta jure imperii and acta jure gestionis, where the umbrella clause 
protection refers to the former.
227
 Indeed, the violation of an umbrella clause should in-
volve some public authority beyond the ‘simple’ breach of contract, when the state “steps 
out of its role of an ordinary contracting party.”228 Therefore the umbrella clause protection 
may be applicable not only to contractual arrangements, but also to obligations assumed by 
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states in unilateral way, through their legislation or executive acts.
229
 
Support schemes for PV solar investments may fall under umbrella clause protection for 
both contractual and non-contractual arrangements. As we have seen, the Italian regulatory 
policy envisaged
230
 payment agreements between RE producers and the state-owned elec-
tricity distribution company. Failure of the state-owned enterprise to respect such contracts 
may elevate a breach of these arrangements to a violation of the applicable treaty. Howev-
er, in most PV solar support schemes the specific promises were given to investors in host 
state legislation, not through contracts. They do not represent contractual arrangements, but 
unilateral obligations of states to accord certain preferable treatment. The treaty protection 
of such obligations has been previously characterized
231
 as falling under the umbrella 
clause standard. 
 Promised pie in the sky: FET and RE investment claims 4.3
As mentioned in the previous section, the legitimate expectations of the investor form the 
central part of the FET standard. If an investor relies on state promises, which influence her 
decision to invest or to proceed with investment, then that investor may have a legitimate 
expectation in the state fulfilling that promise. In the described scenarios relating to PV 
solar support schemes, the reduction of incentives was often performed contrary to initial 
promises, with retroactive or retrospective effect and without proper notifications to inves-
tors. 
In regard to the reduction in PV solar support schemes, the legitimate expectations of in-
vestors may have been violated by the following measures: (i) the introduction of new re-
strictions to PV solar projects; (ii) retroactive and retrospective policy changes; (iii) lack of 
transparency in decision-making; (iv) failure to adopt remedial legislation; and (v) bad faith 
behavior of states. 
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 New restrictions to PV solar projects 4.3.1
In several cases described (Spanish Decree Law 15/2012, amendments to the Italian ‘Robin 
Hood law’232) states introduced taxation measures which were implicitly targeting RE and 
particularly PV solar investments. These types of measures have the possibility of violating 
two separate investment treaty standards as being contrary to an investor’s legitimate ex-
pectations: protection against indirect expropriation without adequate compensation and the 
FET standard. 
In both instances the severity of deprivations will be evaluated with a careful eye to the 
scope of the state’s police powers. Previous tribunals have repeatedly argued that the exe-
cution of a regulatory right per se does not constitute a treaty violation. There are no cases, 
where compensation was ordered for legitimate environmental regulatory measures.
233
 In 
the Lemire II case,
234
 the Tribunal noted that the claim for material wrongfulness of the 
regulatory decision will not suffice for a breach, so long as the state organ did not act in an 
arbitrary or capricious way.
235
  
What is an ‘arbitrary action’ and how its prohibition relates to the FET standard is still sub-
ject to academic debate and has no uniform answer in arbitral practice.
236
 The test adopted 
by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the ELSI case
237
 was supported in practice as a 
crucial threshold for the finding of arbitrary action.
238
 According to the Court, such action 
should constitute “a willful disregard of due process of law, an act which shocks, or at least 
surprises, a sense of juridical propriety.”239 It seems doubtful whether this high threshold 
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could be violated in the PV solar cases, where the adoption of restrictive measures was 
motivated by more or less genuine budget concerns, and therefore is less likely to appear 
‘shocking’ or ‘surprising.’ After all, the Member States shall always be able “to control the 
effect and costs of their national support schemes according to their potential, whilst main-
taining investor confidence,” as noted by the CJEU in the recent Essen Belgium case.240 
What is worth mentioning is that qualification of action as arbitrary may depend not only 
on the state’s behavior, but also on investor’s legitimate expectations. As it was noted by 
the Tribunal in the Alpha Projectholding case,
241
 the arbitrary change of the “rules of the 
game” which could undermine the legitimate expectations or representations made to the 
investor shall be avoided.
242
 As has been seen from the overview of RE policies in certain 
EU Member States, states initially induced investors by subjecting them to a preferable 
regulatory (especially, taxation) regime, which was perceived as a guarantee of stable and 
favorable treatment by investors. Therefore, even if new regulatory changes were adopted 
for a reasonable and valid public purpose, they may still run contrary to the investors’ ex-
pectations and could amount to an arbitrary action. 
Finally, new deprivatory measures specifically targeted PV solar investments, leaving un-
touched other RE investments (examples include Czech Law 402/2010 and Spanish Decree 
1/2012). What can be seen from the overview of RE policies is that some of these measures 
discriminated between different types of investors, without any reference to their nationali-
ty (and thus beyond the traditional debate of national and most favorable nation treatment 
obligations). Can such measures be considered discriminatory? A three-fold test has been 
developed in ITA jurisprudence
243
 for the identification of discriminatory measures: (i) 
identification of a ‘like situation’ or ‘like circumstances;’ (ii) presence of less favorable 
treatment; and (iii) absence of any justification for discriminatory treatment. The second 
criterion, less preferable treatment of PV solar investors in comparison to other RE inves-
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tors was described in an earlier section.
244
 Therefore, this section will only consider the 
remaining two issues: whether PV solar energy producers and producers of other types of 
RE were in ‘like’ circumstances; and whether the discriminatory character of deprivatory 
measures can be justified by legitimate reasons? 
With regard to the first criterion, one may see that investment in PV solar projects benefit-
ted significantly from the introduction of cheap PV solar panel technologies, which did not 
happen to other RE producers. Therefore, PV solar investors eventually appeared in more 
favorable conditions than other investors and these conditions cannot be characterized as 
‘like.” The second criterion logically follows: the increase in the PV solar market required 
states to implement mitigation measures tailored specifically to this type of investment. It 
may be concluded that the discrimination between investors in different types of RE was 
legitimized by the distinctively different position of PV solar investors. 
 Retroactive and retrospective application of reductions 4.3.2
As seen in the overview of RE policies in certain EU Member States, there was a certain 
point where the initial over-incentivization of PV solar investment became unbearable for 
state budgets. The inducement of prospective investments was prevented by the introduc-
tion of capacity caps and gradual tariff reductions. However, the central question remains 
with regard to admitted investments, which were guaranteed stable tariff rates for 15 to 25 
years. Implementation of retroactive and retrospective measures became the common way 
for states to reduce expenses. It follows that such negative changes can form the basis of an 
FET claim. 
As a preliminary point, it is important to avoid terminological confusion. The legal doctrine 
distinguishes between ‘retroactive’ and ‘retrospective’ measures. The distinction is debat-
ed, and according to one highly persuasive source
245
 the terms can be used interchangeably. 
However, both terms can help in the categorization of different measures, and therefore are 
worth introducing. The simple distinction can be framed as follows: a retrospective statute 
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has prospective character, but arises from past events, while a retroactive statute changes 
the initial law and thus applies to past, present and future events.
246
 An earlier study
247
 on 
retroactive and retrospective reductions of PV solar support schemes concluded that in the 
majority they have ‘retrospective’ rather than ‘retroactive’ force.248 This argument has lim-
ited value in abstracto: according to these authors,
249
 the legality of both types of measures 
is highly dependent on the applicable law as different standards have been elaborated in 
national legal systems and under EU law. 
Turning back to investment arbitration, one may suggest that retroactive changes may be 
permissible under a state’s police powers and thus fall outside the scope of investment trea-
ty protection. However, these reductions have one significant difference from general regu-
latory measures: specification. States expressly guaranteed stable tariff rates, and failure to 
respect them is likely to constitute a violation of FET. A similar line of argumentation is 
applicable to the indirect expropriation standard, where the frustration of investors shall 
originate from the revocation of state’s specific commitments.250  
The stress on specificity is supported by arbitral tribunal practice. In EDF,
251
 the Tribunal 
drew a line between changes relating to a “State’s normal regulatory power and the evolu-
tionary character of economic life,” which do not constitute a breach of the FET, and 
changes in violation of specific promises and representations, which can violate this stand-
ard.
252
 However, the form of expression may matter: in the PV solar cases the guarantees 
were expressed in host state legislation and not investment contracts. 
A regulatory right is characterized as a reserved right, which can be exercised by the state 
in the absence of specific and concrete stabilization arrangements.
253
 An earlier study
254
 
suggested that, in the absence of stabilization contract clauses, states could plan stabiliza-
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tion mechanisms in advance during treaty negotiations. These authors recommend states to 
fasten their commitments towards RE objectives by expressly promising to treat any revo-
cation of benefits for RE projects as a compensatory expropriation. This proposal can hard-
ly be recognized as viable. Enlarging the scope of stabilization clauses to the uncountable 
quantity of investors could significantly narrow down the state’s regulatory freedom. One 
can only imagine what would have happened if all PV solar investments were structured 
through contracts with stabilization clauses, depriving states from genuine regulatory right 
for changing circumstances and leading to massive unconditioned compensations. 
In conclusion, it may be reiterated that in order to avoid FET-related claims states need to 
be careful with regard to both the form and scope of their commitments in support 
schemes. The unavoidable deprivatory measures must be strictly within the corridor of 
permissible regulatory action in compliance with given guarantees and representations. 
 Lack of transparency in decision making process 4.3.3
Even an unfavorable decision may be legitimized by broad discussion with investors and a 
state’s continuous efforts to achieve public consensus. Failure to disclose regulatory plans 
and to discuss future negative amendments would therefore lead to misunderstanding be-
tween the state and investors, and push the latter to different mechanisms of protection, 
including ITA. 
As indicated earlier, transparency in the regulatory decision-making process forms one of 
the constitutive elements of the FET standard.
255
 In the Metalclad case,
256
 the Tribunal de-
clared that there should be “no room for doubt or uncertainty” in the legal framework sur-
rounding the investment.
257
 The Tribunal concluded that Mexico failed to ensure “a trans-
parent and predictable framework” for the investment.258 In the Maffezini case,259 the Tri-
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bunal declared that the lack of transparency in the transaction was incompatible with the 
FET obligation.
260
 
Our analysis shows that governments have used different forms of investor participation in 
the decision-making process related to PV solar incentives. From the year of 2000, the 
Czech ERO was obliged to publish electricity tariffs for public discussion. In Germany any 
new reduction in tariff rates permitted under the Renewable Energy Sources Act must also 
be preceded by a public discussion, where suggestions from investors are accumulated and 
distributed on a special website. The tariff cuts in Spain were reportedly
261
 preceded by 
consultations with energy firms (however, a more recent report mentioned that the RE in-
dustry “seems to be entirely ignored” during policy negotiations262). As a generally accept-
ed policy, states often involve stakeholders in public discussion as a means of preventing 
rumors, uncertainty and frustration from investors. 
Transparency has paramount importance for the financial stability of investors. For exam-
ple, in small-scale PV solar investments (often installed by families within a single house-
hold), many investment were made with borrowed money on the assumption of astable 
return. The recent Spanish critique
263
 of incentive cuts referred to a significant sum of 
money which local households had invested in PV solar projects, and later faced as a bank-
ing debt without possibilities of repayment. Similar problems were observed in the Italian 
market.
264
 In Spain this situation eventually resulted in mass protest demonstration against 
the cuts. It may be concluded, that timely consultations and broad media coverage of deci-
sion-making processes could help to safeguard the financial standing of investors and pro-
tect their legitimate expectations.  
Lastly, it is worth mentioning that investors should be attentive to the ongoing discussions 
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and to constantly monitor the legal framework of the host state. In the Plantanol case,
265
 
the CJEU declared that a “prudent and circumspect economic operator” cannot plead the 
principle of protection of legitimate expectations if they could have foreseen the adoption 
of unfavorable measure. Such measures are often preceded by broad public discussion and 
media coverage, which makes pleading of reasonableness of expectations even more diffi-
cult.
266
 
 Failure to adopt mitigating measures 4.3.4
Even facing the need of regulatory action, the state may respect investors´ expectations by 
substituting the costly support schemes with a mitigating regulation. This helps to prevent 
an “all or nothing” deadlock, when the maintenance of measures in the full amount is no 
longer possible. Investors thus may either agree to the proposed changes, or object to them, 
facing an unpredictable conflict over the scope of state police powers. 
A relevant example can be found in the series of Italian reforms. As noted earlier, the 
emergency legislative intervention of 2014
267
 placed three options
268
 before investors. All 
three options required a change to the guaranteed incentive scheme, but gave investors op-
tions as to which reduction is best suited for their particular circumstances. Investors were 
asked to communicate their preferred choice before 30 November 2014. In the absence of 
such communication, one of three options applied to them by default. In addition, the de-
cree suggested
269
 mitigating the hurdles of investors by loans with favorable conditions 
provided by the Deposit Fund (Cassa Depositi e Prestiti S.p.A.). The law further prescribed 
for the Ministry of Economics and Finance to adopt regulation for these loans. A recent 
critique
270
 emphasized that these loans were not adopted within the expected time limits. 
Ten days before the deadline for communication, the Italian Association of Renewable En-
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ergy Producers (AssoRinnovabili) urged
271
 the awareness of investors’ instability and called 
for the postponement of the deadline. Only in January 2015 the Ministry published the de-
cree
272
 clarifying the situation with loans. This measure included state guarantees in the 
amount up to the 80 percent of the producers’ debt before the credit institutions, payable in 
case of producers’ default. 
What can be evidenced in this example is that from one side the state pressured investors’ 
towards depriving measures by promising them effective mitigation. From another side, the 
state failed to adopt these mitigating measures in a timely manner. As a result, during the 
fall of 2014 investors in Italy faced a great amount of uncertainty and unpredictability with 
regard to future policy changes. The lack of the state’s timely reaction thus undermined 
their legitimate expectations. 
 Bad faith behavior 4.3.5
Previous tribunals have underlined the importance of good faith behavior when assessing 
the FET standard. In the Waste Management case, the Tribunal characterized
273
 acting in 
good faith as a basic requirement under the FET standard. Later, in the Sempra case, the 
Tribunal placed good faith at the heart of FET standard.
274
 
One may find evidence of bad faith behavior in public statements of state officials concern-
ing PV solar investors. For example, the prime minister of Czech Republic has reportedly 
expressed some verbal attacks on PV solar investors, characterized as ‘solar barons.’275 The 
general ‘bad media’ reaction over PV solar projects is observed in most EU Members 
States and its improvement is recognized as one of the primary goals of RE policy re-
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forms.
276
 
Due to the vague and comprehensive character of bad faith behavior, it is impossible to 
make a definitive conclusion here. However, it may be deduced that the gross disregard of 
investors´ positions, which was exercised in an arbitral and inconsistent manner, is likely to 
be recognized as a violation of the good faith requirement on behalf of the state. To the 
contrary, the more justifications states present for the change of support schemes and the 
more mitigating measures they adopt to save the investments, the less likely their conduct 
would be qualified as being in bad faith. 
 States in Different Leagues: What Influences the Caseload? 4.4
As we have observed earlier, European states face a different numbers of cases. On the 
basis of our analysis, it is suggested that following the groups of factors, alone or in combi-
nation, can generate this divergence in numbers: (i) factors relating to national RE policies; 
(ii) factors relating to arbitral process; and (iii) factors relating to investor behavior. 
The first group of factors comprises inter alia different incentivization rates and respon-
siveness of the national legal framework to changing circumstances. It may be recalled that 
even the German support schemes were originally quite generous. However, the legislators 
in Germany managed to predict adverse consequences and quickly implement a number of 
measures (like capacity caps and gradual reductions) that balanced investors’ expectations 
with state budget capabilities. In the German example, this success of support schemes was 
also achieved by the early research and development of appropriate RE policies, and strict 
compliance with EU rules on permissible state aid. Among other influential factors con-
nected with RE policies, one needs to mention the geographical allocation of incentive 
schemes between different regions, depending on their investment attractiveness, and co-
operation arrangements with neighboring states (e.g. electricity pool spot exchange mod-
els). 
The second group of factors includes pre-dispute settlements, which remain unknown to 
general public, as well as domestic litigation attempts, which can appear time-consuming 
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and result in delays before filing an international claim. Another temporary factor, which 
does not lessen the number of claims, but postpones their initiation, is the treaty imposed 
cooling-off period of 3 to 6 months, prescribed by the ECT and infra-EU BITs. In order to 
prepare a well-substantiated international claim, investors may reasonably spend time in 
negotiations with governmental bodies and rely first on domestic courts, before elevating 
the case to the international level. 
The third group includes proactive behavior of investors and their legal counsel. Investment 
arbitration is risky and expensive, and therefore requires good financial standing from in-
vestors. Minor investors either appear deprived of this means of dispute settlement, or first 
have to collect substantial sums to initiate the proceedings. Moreover, as has been seen in 
earlier sections, several law firms started specializing in arbitration of PV solar cases and 
are now amassing a significant number of clients, while firms with less experience may 
appear less decisive to initiate arbitral proceedings. 
These three factors are not conclusive, and one may suggest using it only as a basic as-
sumption of the underlying reasons for the variable caseload. More accurate categories will 
be achieved with a quantitative analysis of the cases once more information about them 
becomes publicly available. 
Chapter conclusions: Fear the avalanche 
As observed, PV solar investment cases arise from changes in legislation, which were spe-
cifically adopted for the large-scale inducement of investors. Common peculiarities of 
these cases include the following: (i) similarity in case patterns within one jurisdiction 
(identical causal factors; legal instruments invoked; legal teams acting); (ii) relatively low 
amount of damages requested in individual cases, while the total amount of claims tends to 
expand due to an increasing number of claimants; (iii) temporal factor - nearly simultane-
ous emergence of cases in several jurisdictions; and (iv) lack of knowledge - to the present 
date, cases are still pending, and the level of convergence in tribunal’s reasoning seems 
rather questionable. 
The influx of RE investment cases is likely to invoke several standards of investment pro-
tection. Although the exact combination appears rather imprecise due to the shortage of 
factual data, it is likely that four treaty standards could be invoked in the majority of PV 
 52 
solar cases: FET, indirect expropriation, non-discrimination and umbrella clause protection. 
Bearing in mind that the cases originated from a common factual background (revocation 
of state guarantees of stable treatment and incentive support), one may assume that broad-
est standard of FET is likely to be invoked in the absolute majority of cases. It has been 
long anticipated
277
 that legitimate expectations will play crucial role in the PV solar cases. 
In the analysis provided in this section, a number of popular policy measures of substantive 
and procedural nature have been identified, which were implemented by three most affect-
ed states – Spain, Italy and the Czech Republic, and which are all likely to affect investors’ 
expectations. With regard to new restrictions and the retroactive and/or retrospective appli-
cation of deprivatory measures, it may be concluded that the viability of these measures 
will depend on the tribunals’ perception of state budgetary concerns as part of sovereign 
police powers, and their relation to the specific of commitments given to investors.  
Speaking about procedural irregularities, it is suggested that a lack of transparency in deci-
sion-making process and a states’ failure to adopt remedial legislation can undermine in-
vestors’ expectations. Furthermore, the manifest disregard of investors’ interests and nega-
tive media comments by state officials can evidence bad faith behavior on behalf of states, 
which may also signal a violation of the FET standard. The high value of the standard and 
the assessment of investors’ expectations in the PV solar cases underline the importance of 
careful design of RE support schemes. States need to be cautious about the promises they 
give to investors and how they modify these promises afterwards. 
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5 Conclusions 
In this final section, it is useful to reiterate that PV solar investment disputes represent a 
novel area – for the EU and its Member States, as well as private investors and arbitration 
tribunals, which gain increasing popularity in the absence of established patterns of regula-
tion and settlement of disputes at the domestic level. Many of the conclusions drawn in this 
thesis will require adjustments when more information about arbitral proceedings becomes 
available. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this study, the following can be concluded. 
With regard to the influence of EU policies on RE investment disputes, the regulation of 
RE support schemes within the EU produced a gap between supranationally imposed ob-
jectives of RE promotion and individual responsibility of Member States under investment 
treaties. The EU has limited means of influence on investment arbitral proceedings, which 
are currently exercised through amicus curiae participation, and subsequent involvement 
into enforcement procedures. From a legal perspective, the main arguments of the EU in-
volve both jurisdictional objections (termination or invalidity of intra-EU BITs) and sub-
stantive incompliance with EU law (primarily, regulations on permissible state aid). It is 
nevertheless doubtful whether tribunals will take any broader considerations of EU invest-
ment and environmental policies into account. 
The overview of support measures for PV solar projects in selected EU Member States 
shows similar patterns: states adopted incentives in response to EU Directives, they exper-
imented with tariff rates and eligibility criteria and, once confronted with budgetary needs, 
initiated reduction measures. However, the support schemes for PV solar investments show 
little convergence from the perspectives of ITA. Facing a technological change on the PV 
solar market, some states anticipated adverse changes and immediately adjusted their legis-
lation, while other states took a longer time to respond. The policy fluctuations ultimately 
resulted in reduced or abandoned state support for PV solar investments, and an avalanche 
of RE investment claims. 
PV solar investment cases have a number of common features. They all originate from dep-
rivatory changes in legislation, which were specifically adopted for the large-scale induce-
ment of investment in PV solar projects. They have similar case patterns within one juris-
diction (identical causal factors; legal instruments invoked; legal teams acting), and show a 
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certain degree of similarity between different jurisdictions. Another common feature is the 
lack of knowledge, as all of cases are currently reported as pending. Therefore, the level of 
convergence among tribunals in their reasoning is largely an unknown variable presently. 
PV solar cases can be characterized as giving low protection for investors through domestic 
judicial or administrative remedies. States tend to downplay legitimate expectations of in-
vestors, secured by legislative guarantees, for the higher goal of regulatory freedom and 
sovereign right of adaptation to changing environment. This view is usually supported by 
national judiciaries. It this situation, investment arbitration provides a reasonable remedy 
for recovering frustrated investments. Nevertheless, the growing number of claims and al-
leged inconsistency of intra-EU BITs with the EU legal order may lead to strong political 
pressure against investment arbitration within the EU. The political deadlock between pub-
lic society goals and individual investment protection will be first solved by arbitrators, 
who need to find a proper balance if they want to preserve investment arbitration within the 
EU. 
Finally, as has been seen from the PV solar policy overview, there is a clash between na-
tional legal systems (where the judiciary favors legislative flexibility over stability of guar-
antees and representations); and investment jurisprudence where the focus is shifted to-
wards investor’s legitimate expectations. This conflict undermines the legitimacy of ITA, 
due to the following reasons. First, domestic and foreign investors receive different reme-
dial rights. Domestic investors appear locked in their national legal systems, which deny 
any wrongdoing, while international investors can pursue treaty arbitration claims against 
host states. As a result, national investors are incentivized to perform investment structur-
ing, thus depriving investment treaty protection of its primary goal: development of foreign 
investment flows.
278
 It is worth mentioning that the recent decision in the Occidental 
case
279
 an ICSID Ad Hoc Committee warned against the expansion of personal jurisdiction 
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towards unprotected third parties. This decision can be interpreted as prohibiting abuse of 
ITA through mechanisms of ‘treaty shopping,’280 which may be used by national PV solar 
investors to gain treaty protection. Second, the divergent interpretation of the same factual 
circumstances (e.g. the legality of retrospective measures) by national courts and invest-
ment tribunals undermines the normative legitimacy of the latter. The recent extensive 
study
281
 shows that arbitrators are generally reluctant to exercise restraint in adjudicating 
matters of national policy, pretending to be an “autonomous regime for categorical review” 
of states’ actions. The proactive role of investment arbitration tribunals and their lack of 
deference to national decision-makers can therefore result in denial of their legitimate au-
thority, and lead to a breakaway from the investment treaty regime. 
To conclude, the gap between interpretations in the PV solar cases poses significant risks 
for the investment treaty regime and the development of investment arbitration. Both states 
and tribunals need to be careful and cooperative if they want to preserve positive percep-
tions of investment arbitration. 
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Figure 1 Host states (39 cases) 
 
 
Figure 2 Year of registration (39 cases)   
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Figure 3 The home state of the investor (39 cases) 
 
 
Figure 4 Legal instruments invoked (39 cases)   
Other 
29 % 
Germany 
27 % 
Luxembourg 
23 % 
Netherlands 
13 % 
UK 
8 % 
BIT 
3 % 
BIT + ECT 
15 % 
ECT 
72 % 
Unknown 
10 % 
vi 
 
 
Figure 5 Arbitral forum (39 cases) 
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Figure 7 Respondent legal counsel (39 cases) 
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